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Why the Apathy in American High Schools? 
JOHN H. BISHOP 
11 too often docile, com- 
pliant, and without initia- 
tive," is how Theodore 
Sizer (1984, p.  54) characterized Amer- 
ican high school students at the end of 
his massive study. John Goodlad (1983) 
described: "a general picture of con- 
siderable passivity among students" (p. 
113). The high school teachers surveyed 
by Goodlad ranked "lack of student in- 
terest" and "lack of parental interest" 
as the two most important problems in 
education. 
Studies of time use and time-on-task 
show that students actively engage in 
a learning activity for only about half 
the time they are in high school. A 
study of schools in Chicago found that 
public schools with high-achieving stu- 
dents averaged about 75% of class time 
for actual instruction; for schools with 
low achieving students, the average 
was 51% of class time (Frederick, 1977). 
Other studies have found that for read- 
ing and math instruction the average 
engagement rate is about 75 (Fischer et 
al., 1978; Goodlad, 1983; Klein, Tyle, & 
Wright, 1979). Overall, Frederick, Wal- 
berg, and Rasher (1979) estimated 
46.5% of the potential learning time was 
lost due to absence, lateness, and inat- 
tention. 
In the High School and Beyond Sur- 
vey, students reported spending an 
average of 3.5 hours per week on 
homework. When homework is added 
to engaged time at school, the total time 
devoted to study, instruction, and prac- 
tice is only 18-22 hours per week-be- 
tween 15 and 20% of the student's wak- 
ing hours during the school year. By 
way of comparison, the typical senior 
spent 10 hours per week in a part-time 
job and about 24 hours per week watch- 
ing television (A. C. Neilsen, 1987). 
Thus, TV occupies as much time as 
learning. Students in other nations 
spend much less time watching TV: 
60% less in Switzerland and 44% less 
in Canada (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Table 
18.1, 1986). 
The student's lack of interest makes 
it difficult for teachers to be demanding. 
Sizer's description of Ms. Shiffe's class, 
is strikingly similar to one of the classes 
I visited in my research: 
Ezlen while the names of liz~ing 
things poured out of Shiffe's lecture, 
no one was taking notes. She zt~anted 
the students to know these names. 
They  did not want to knozt~ them and 
were not going to learn them. Ap-  
parentl!y no outside threat-flunking, 
for example-affrcted the students. 
S h i p  did her thing, the students 
cliattered on, ezlen in the presence of 
a zlisitor. . . . Their coininon front of 
uninterest prollably made eiairtina- 
tioils iiioot. Sh i f e  could not flunk 
thein all, and, if their performance 
illas uiziforml!y shoddy, she illould 
have to pass thetn all. Her despera- 
tion illas as obz~ious as the students 
ciuelty toii~ard her. (yp .  157-158) 
How does a teacher avoid this treat- 
ment? Sizer's descrivtion of Mr. 
Brody's class provides one example 
He signaled to the students a h a t  
t l ~ e  ininiina, the feiil questions for a 
test, alere; all tenth- and elez~enth- 
~ r a d e r s  co~rld master these iilith ab- 
su rdl!l little difficulty. The !louilgsters 
picked u p  the signal and kept their 
part of the bargaiii b!y being frieizdly 
aiid orderl!y. Tlie!y did not plrsli 
Brody, aiid he did not plrslz t l ~ e m .  
TIie classrooin illas tranquil and 
bland. B!y in!y iilatch, ozler a third L J ~  
the time illas spent oil ii~atters other 
tllan history, and tiilo-thirds of the 
classes ostei~sibl!y dezloted to tlie sub- 
rect illere uiideii~anding. Brod!y and 
his class had a~reenieilt, all right, 
agreeinent that reduced the efforts of 
llotl~ students and teacher to an ir- 
reducible and pathetic miniiinlii~. ( [ I .  
156) 
Some teachers are able to overcome 
the obstacles and induce their students 
to undertake tough learning tasks. But, 
for most, the student's lassitude is 
demoralizing. Everyone in the system 
recognizes the problem, but each group 
fixes blame on someone else. As one of 
my students put it: 
A s  it stands I IOZU,  there is an 1111- 
ending, ezler increasing c!yclic prob- 
lem. Teacher and administrator dis- 
interest, apathy, and their lack of 
dedication results in students becoin- 
ing even more ~~ni~zot iuated  an do- 
cile, nlhich in turn allozis teacllers to 
be less interested and dedicated. If 
students don't care, zilh!/ sllould 
teacllers? I f  teachers don't care, i ~ h y  
should the students? (Krista, 1987) 
Yes, it is a classic chicken versus egg 
problem. We assign teachers the re- 
sponsibility for setting high standards 
but we do not give them any of the 
tools that might be effective for induc- 
ing student observance of the academic 
gods of the classroom. They finally 
must rely on the force of their own per- 
sonalities. All too often teachers cbm- 
promise academic demands because 
the majority of the class sees no need 
to accept -them as reasonable and 
legitimate. 
Student apathy and lack of motiva- 
tion are not the whole of the vroblem. 
Parental apathy and lack of motivation 
are similarly widespread. A compara- 
tive study of primary education in 
Taiwan, Japan, and the United States 
has shown that ezlen though Ainericaiz 
chlldreii iilere learriin~ the least in school, 
Americaii parelits illeve the most satisfied 
iilith the yerforiizaizce of their local schools 
(Stevenson, Lee, & Stigler, 1986). Why 
are American parents holding their chil- 
JOHN H.  BISHOP is at the Center for Ad- 
zlanced Humail Resource Studies, Neil] York 
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dren and schools to a lower standard 
than Japanese and Taiwanese-as well 
as European-parents? 
The fundamental cause of the prob- 
lem is our uncritical acceptance of in- 
stitutional arrangements that do not 
adequately recognize and reinforce stu- 
dent effort and achievement. During 
the 1960s and 1970s we adopted prac- 
tices and curricula that hid a failure to 
teach, that protected adolescents from 
the consequences of failing to learn, 
and that prevented many of those who 
did learn from reaping the fruits of their 
labor. Although there are benefits to 
staying in school, most students realize 
few benefits from working hard zc~hile in 
school. The lack of incentives for effort 
is a consequence of three phenomena: 
The labor market fails to reward ef- 
fort and achievement in high 
school. 
The peer group actively discourages 
academic effort. 
Admission to selective colleges is 
not based on an absolute or exter- 
nal standard of achievement in high 
school subjects. It is based instead 
on aptitude tests which do not as- 
sess the high school cumculum and 
on such measures of student per- 
formance as class rank and grade 
point averages, which are defined 
relative to classmates' perfor- 
mances, not relative to an external 
standard. 
The Absence of Major Economic 
Rewards for Effort in High School 
Students who plan to look for a job 
immediately after high school typically 
spend less time on their studies than 
those who plan to attend college. In 
large part, most see very little connec- 
tion between how much they learn and 
their future success in the labor market. 
Less than a quarter of 10th graders be- 
lieve that geometry, trigonometry, biol- 
ogy, chemistry, and physics are need- 
ed to qualify for their first choice oc- 
cupation (Longitudinal Survey of 
American Youth, 1988). Statistical 
studies of the youth labor market con- 
firm their skepticism about the benefits 
of taking tough courses and studying 
hard: 
Employers rank "reading, writing, 
math, and reasoning ability" num- 
ber 5 on a list of 6 abilities they look 
for when hiring (Survey of the Na- 
tional Federation of Independent 
Business [NFIB] membership).' 
For students seeking part-time 
employment while attending high 
school, grades and performance on 
academic achievementiaptitude 
tests have essentially no impact on 
labor market success. Thev have (a) 
no effect on the chances Af finding 
work when one is seeking it during 
high school, and (b) no effect on the 
wage rate of the jobs obtained while 
in high school (Hotchkiss, Bishop, 
& Gardner, 1982). 
As Table 1 shows, for those who do 
not go to college full-time, high 
school grades and test scores had 
(a) no effect on the wage rate of the 
jobs obtained immediately after 
high school in Kang and Bishop's 
(1984) analysis of High School and 
Beyond seniors and only a 1 to 
4.7% increase in wages per stan- 
dard deviation improvement in test 
scores and grade point average in 
Meyer's (1982) analysis of Class of 
1972 data; (b) a moderate effect on 
wage rates and earnings after 4 or 
5 years (Gardner, 1982, found an 
effect of 4.8% per standard devia- 
tion of achievement and Meyer, 
1982, found an effect of 4.3 to 6.0% 
per standard deviation of achieve- 
ment); and (c) a small negative ef- 
fect on the risk of unemployment 
immediately after high school. 
The long delay before labor market re- 
wards are received is important because 
most teenagers are short-sighted, so 
benefits possible 10 years in the future 
may have little influence on their deci- 
sions. 
Although the economic benefits of 
higher achievement to the employee 
are quite modest and do not appear un- 
til long after graduation, the benefits to 
the employer (and therefore, to national 
production) are immediately realized in 
higher productivity. Over the last 80 
years, industrial psychologists have 
conducted hundreds of studies, involv- 
ing hundreds of thousands of workers, 
on the relationship between productivi- 
ty in particular jobs and various pre- 
dictors of that productivity. They have 
found that scores on tests measuring 
competence in reading, mathematics, 
science, and problem solving are 
strongly related to productivity on the 
job (Ghiselli, 1973).2 
Figure 1 compares the percentage ef- 
fect of mathematical and verbal achieve- 
ment (specifically a difference of three 
grade-level equivalents in test scores or 
.7 GPA points, on a 4 point scale) on 
the productivity of a clerical worker, on 
wages of male clerical workers (Taub- 
man & Wales, 1975), and on the wages 
of young women who have not gone 
to college (Kang & Bishop, 1984; Meyer, 
TABLE 1 
Effect of Academic Achievement 
on the Wage Rates of High School Graduates 
Date 
of 
Percent Change 
in Wage Rate Achievement 
Study and Data Set Graduation Age Measures Male Female 
Wage Rates 
Kang & Bishop (1985) 1980 19 Test-Math,Voc,Read -1.9 -.3 
High School & Beyond GPA in Grade 12 .6 2.2 
Gardner (1983) 1976-1982 19-24 AFQT 4.8 4.8 
NLS Youth 
Daymont & Rumberger 1976-1979 19-21 GPA in Grade 9 .3 2.7 
NLS Youth (1982) 
Meyer (1982) 1972 19 Class Rank Grade 12 0.0 2.5 
(Weekly earnings) Test Composite 1.2 2.2 
Class of 1972 
Hause (1975) 1961 19 IQ,Test-Math -3.7 - 
Project Talent (white) 23 IQ,Test-Math 6.1 - 
The table reports the percentage response of the wage rate or earnings to a one standard deviation 
improvement in a measure of academic achievement. For high school seniors a one standard devia- 
tion differential on an achievement test is about equal to 3.5 grade level equivalents or 110 points 
on the Verbal SAT. For GPA, one standard deviation is about .7  when C's = 2.0, B's = 3.0 and 
A's = 4.0. 
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FIGURE I .  
Impacts of One Standard Deviation 
in Achievement 
Job Wage Rate 
Performance 30-45 yr, old 
Clerical job male clerical 
workers 
Wage Rate Wage Rate 
19 yr. old 22-23 yr. old 
female female 
high school high school 
graduates graduates 
1982). Productivity clearly increases 
much more than wage rates.3 Ap- 
parently, it is a youth's employer, not 
the youth, who benefits the most when 
a student who isn't college-bound 
works hard in school and improves his 
or her academic achievements. The 
youth is more likely to find a job, but 
not one with an appreciably higher 
wage 
Reasons for the Discrepancy between 
Wage Rates and Productivity on the 
Job. Why doesn't competition between 
employers result in much higher wages 
for those who achieve more in high 
school? The lack of objective informa- 
tion available to employers on applicant 
accomplishments, skills, and pro- 
ductivity explains much. Tests are avail- 
able for~measuring competency in read- 
ing, writing, mathematics, science, and 
problem solving, but EEOC guidelines 
resulted in a drastic reduction in their 
use after 1971. A 1987 survev of a strati- 
fied random sample of small-and 
medium-sized employers who were 
members of the National Federation of 
Independent Business found that ap- 
titude test scores had been obtained in 
only 3.15% of the hiring decisions 
studied. 
Other potential sources of informa- 
tion on effort and achievement in high 
school are transcripts and referrals from 
teachers who know the applicant. Both 
are under-used. In the NFIB survey, 
transcripts had been obtained prior to 
the selection decision for only 13.7% of 
the hires of people with 12 or fewer 
years of schooling. If a student or 
graduate has given written permission 
for a transcript to be sent to an em- 
ployer, the Buckley amendment obli- 
gates the school to respond. Many high 
schools are not, however, responding 
to such requests. The experience of Na- 
tionwide Insurance, headquartered in 
Columbus, Ohio, is probably represen- 
tative. The company obtains permission 
to get high school records from all 
young people who interview for a job. 
It sent over 1,200 signed requests to 
high schools in 1982 and received only 
93 responses. The company reported 
that colleges were more responsive. 
Most high schools have apparently de- 
signed their systems for responding to 
requests for transcripts around the 
needs of college-bound students rather 
than the students who seek jobs im- 
mediately after graduating. 
There is an additional barrier to the 
use of high school transcripts in selec- 
ting new employees-when high 
schools do respond, it takes a great deal 
of time. For Nationwide Insurance, the 
response almost invariably took more 
than 2 weeks. Given this time lag, if 
employers required transcripts prior to 
making hiring selections, a job offer 
could not be made until a month or so 
after an application had been received. 
Most jobs are filled much more rapidly 
than that. 
The only Information about school ex- 
periences requested by most employers 
is years of schooling, diplomas and cer- 
tificates obtained, and area of speciali- 
zation. Only 16% of the NFIB employ- 
ers asked the applicants with 12 or 
fewer years of schooling to report their 
grade-point averages. The lack of appli- 
cation questions about school perfor- 
mance does not reflect an employer be- 
lief that school performance is a poor 
predicator of job performance. In policy 
capturing experiments (Hollenbeck & 
Smith, 1984), grade-point average infor- 
mation had a major effect on the ratings 
employers assign to job applicants.   he 
absence of questions about grades from 
most job applications probably reflects 
the low reliability of self-reported data, 
the difficulties of verifying it, and the 
fear of EEO challenges to such ques- 
tions. 
Hiring on the basis of recommenda- 
tions by high school teachers is also un- 
common. In the NFIB survey, when 
someone with 12 or fewer years of 
schooling was hired, the new hire had 
been referred or recommended by voca- 
tional teachers only in 5.5% of the cases 
and referred by someone else in the 
high school in only 3.1%. 
Clearly, hiring selections and starting 
wage rates often do not reflect the com- 
petencies and abilities students have 
developed in school. Instead, hiring 
decisions are based on observable char- 
acteristics (such as years of schooling 
and field of study) that serve as signals 
for the competencies the employer can- 
not observe directly. A study of how in- 
dividual wage rates varied with initial 
job performance found that when peo- 
ple hired for the same or very similar 
jobs are compared, someone who is 
20% more productive than average is 
typically paid only 1.6% more. After a 
year at a firm, better producers received 
only a 4% higher wage at nonunion 
firms with about 20 employees, and 
they had no wage advantage at union- 
ized establishments with more than 100 
employees or at nonunion establish- 
ments with more than 400 employees 
(Bishop, 1987a). 
Employers structure their jobs this 
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way because feasible measures of indi- 
vidual productivity are unreliable and 
unstable, because workers are reluctant 
to accept jobs in which the judgement 
of one supervisor can result in large 
wage declines, and because pay that is 
highly contingent on performance can 
weaken cooperation and generate in- 
centives to sabotage others. 
Despite their higher productivity, 
young zoorkers zoho have achieved in high 
school do not receive appreciably higher 
wage rates after high school. The student 
who works hard must wait many years 
to reap rewards, and even then the 
magnitude of the wage and earnings ef- 
fect-a 1 to 2% increase in earnings per 
grade level equivalent on achievement 
tests-is hardly much of an incentive. 
It is considerably smaller than the ac- 
tual gain in productivity that results. 
The Zero-Sum Nature of Academic 
Competition in High School 
The second root cause of high school 
students' poor motivation is peer pres- 
sure against studying hard. The prima- 
ry reason for peer pressure against stu- 
dying is that pursuing academic success 
forces students into a zero-sum com- 
petition with their classmates. Their 
achievement is not being measured 
against an absolute, external standard. 
In contrast to scout merit badges, for ex- 
ample, where recognition is given for 
achieving a fixed standard of com- 
petence, the schools' measures of 
achievement assess performance rela- 
tive to fellow students', through grades 
and class rank. When students try hard 
to excel, they set themselves apart, 
cause rivalries and may make things 
worse for friends. When we set up a zero 
sutn competition atnongfrie~zds, zoe should 
not be surprised zilhen they decide not to 
compete. All work groups have ways of 
sanctioning "rate busters." High school 
students call them "brain geeks," 
"grade grubbers," and "brown 
nosers . " 
Young people are not lazy. In their 
jobs after school and on the football 
field, they work very hard. In these en- 
vironments they are part of a team 
where individual efforts are visible and 
appreciated by teammates. Competition 
and rivalry are not absent, but they are 
offset by shared goals, shared successes 
and external measures of achievement 
(i.e. satisfied customers or winning the 
game). On the sports field, there is no 
greater sin than giving up, even when 
the score is hopelessly one-sided. On 
the job, tasks not done by one worker 
will generally have to be completed by 
another. In too many high schools, 
when it comes to academics, a student's 
success is purely personal. 
The second reason for peer norms 
against studying is that most students 
perceive the chance of receiving recog- 
nition for an academic achievement to 
be so slim they have given up  trying. 
At most high school awards cere- 
monies, the academic recognition goes 
to only a few-those at the very top of 
the class. By 9th grade, most students 
are already so far behind the leaders, 
that they know they have no chance of 
being perceived as academically suc- 
cessful. Their reaction is often to 
denigrate the students who take learn- 
ing seriously and to honor other forms 
of achievement-athletics, dating, hold- 
ing their liquor, and being "cool"-- 
which offer them better chances of 
success. 
The lack of external standards for 
judging academic achievement and the 
resulting zero sum nature of academic 
competition in the school also influ- 
ences parents, school boards, and local 
school administrators. Parents can see 
that setting higher academic standards 
or hiring better teachers will not on 
average improve their child's rank in 
class or GPA. And raising standards at 
their daughter's high school will have 
only minor effects on how she does on 
the SAT, so why worry about stan- 
dards? In any case, doing well on the 
SAT matters only for those who aspire 
to attend a selective college. Most stu- 
dents plan to attend open-entry public 
colleges, which admit all high school 
graduates from the state with the re- 
quisite courses. Scholarships are award- 
ed on the basis of financial need, not 
academic merit. 
The parents of children not planning 
to go to college have an even weaker 
incentive to demand high standards at 
the local high school. They believe that 
what counts in the labor market is get- 
ting the diploma, not learning algebra. 
They can see that learning more will be 
of only modest benefit to their child's 
future and that higher standards might 
put at risk what is really important- 
the diploma. 
Only when educational outcomes are 
aggregated, at the state or national 
levels, do the real costs of mediocre 
schools become apparent. The whole 
community loses because the work 
force is less efficient, and it becomes dif- 
ficult to attract new industry. Com- 
petitiveness deteriorates and the na- 
tion's standard of living declines. This 
is precisely why employers, governors, 
and state legislatures have been the 
energizing forces of school reform. 
State governments, however, are far re- 
moved from the classroom, and the in- 
struments available to them for impos- 
ing reforms are limited. If students, 
parents, and school board officials per- 
ceive the rewards for learning to be 
minimal, state efforts to improve the 
quality of education will not succeed. 
Incentives to Learn in Other Nations 
The tendency not to reward effort and 
learning in high school appears to be a 
peculiarly American phenomenon. 
Marks in school are the major determi- 
nant of who gets the most preferred ap- 
prenticeships in Germany. In Canada, 
Australia, Japan, and Europe, the edu- 
cational systems administer achieve- 
ment exams that are closely tied to the 
curriculum. Performance on these ex- 
ams is the primary determinant of ad- 
mission to a university and to a field of 
study. Job a.pplications, at all levels, re- 
quire information about exam grades. 
Good grades on the toughest exams, 
those in physics, chemistry, and ad- 
vanced mathematics, carry particular 
weight with employers and univer- 
sities. 
Parents in these countries know that 
a child's future depends critically on 
how much is learned in secondary 
school. In many countries the options 
for upper secondary schooling depend 
primarily on the child's performance in 
lower secondary school, not on where 
the parents can afford to live as in the 
U.S. National exams are the yardstick, 
so achievement tends to be measured 
relative to everyone else's in the nation 
and not just relative to the child's class- 
mates. As a result, parents in most 
other Western nations demand more 
and get more from their local schools 
than we do. Take English-speaking 
Canada, for example. The 25% of Cana- 
dian 18-year-olds taking chemistry 
know just as much chemistry as the 
very select 1% of Americans who are 
taking their second high school chemis- 
try course. The 28% taking biology 
know much more than the 6% of Amer- 
ican 17- to 18-year-olds who are taking 
their second biology course (Interna- 
tional Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement, 1988). In 
mathematics only 3% of American stu- 
dents achieve the standard reached by 
more than half of Japanese students. 
Thoughts on Solutions 
The key to motivation is recognizing 
and rewarding learning effort and 
achievement. Employers should start 
demanding high school transcripts and 
give academic achievement (particularly 
achievement in math and science) 
much greater weight when hiring. Busi- 
ness and industry should communicate 
this policy to schools, parents, and stu- 
dents. High school graduates should 
not be relegated to sales clerk jobs sim- 
ply because of their age. Like their 
peers in Europe, Canada, and Japan, 
they should be allowed to compete for 
really attractive jobs on the basis of the 
knowledge and skills they have gained 
in high school. 
Schools should reduce the disincen- 
tives to studying. Cooperative learning 
such as Student Teams-Achievement 
Divisions would encourage the peer 
group to reward learning effort by hav- 
ing students study in small heterogene- 
ous groups and structuring competition 
between evenly matched teams, rather 
than unevenly matched individuals 
(Slavin, 1983). Criterion referenced 
competency profiles should be available 
for students, describing and certifying 
their academic, vocational, artistic, and 
extra-curricular accomplishments. Fre- 
quent awards ceremonies should recog- 
nize individual effort to attain learning 
goals, so that every student who works 
hard is recognized sometime in the 
school year. Those seeking work will be 
able to use their grades, as well as com- 
petency profiles and awards, as aids in 
securing employment. 
Although the problems are less 
dramatic for the college-bound, parallel 
efforts should be made to increase in- 
centives for them. College counselors 
and admission officers should deem- 
phasize SATs, rank in class, and GPA 
and substitute criterion-referenced sys- 
tems of assessment such as AP exams, 
in which the student is not engaged in 
zero sum competition with classmates. 
Although paper and pencil achieve- 
ment tests tied to the state's curriculum 
should be part of this assessment, the 
measures of achievement available 
must be broadened to include such ac- 
complishments as essay writing, con- 
versing in a foreign language, conduct- 
ing laboratory experiments, playing an 
instrument, repairing a car, and so 
forth. 
Institutional arrangements of schools 
and the labor market have profound ef- 
fects on the incentives available to stu- 
dents, teachers, parents, and school ad- 
ministrators. The passivity and inatten- 
tion of students, the low morale of 
teachers, the defeat of so many school 
levies, and our low rankings on inter- 
national measures of achievement are 
all logical outcomes of institutional ar- 
rangements that weaken student's in- 
centives to study and their parents' in- 
centives to demand high quality educa- 
tion for them. Only with an effective 
system of rewards within the schools 
and the labor market can we hope to 
overcome the pervasive apathy in 
American high schools and achieve 
excellence. 
'The number of useable respondents was 
2014. 
2These tests measure the competencies that 
are the prime objectives of schooling. School 
attendance has been shown to improve per- 
formance on these tests (Lorge, 1945). Between 
World War I and World War 11, the average 
IQ test scores of literate white army draftees 
increased by 11 points. 
3Studies that measure output for different 
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